During the past decade, the study of relationship marketing and customer relationship management has attracted the attention of several marketing scholars (e.g.,
Increasingly, it is believed that successful and lasting relational exchanges are those in which partners go beyond short-term transactional benefits and incorporate behavioral factors such as trust and commitment (e.g., Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987; Gundlach, Achrol, and Mentzer 1995; Sirdeshmukh, Singh, and Sabol 2002) . This belief has pervaded marketing thought such that many scholars, especially in Europe, are calling for a paradigm shift in marketing (e.g., Grönroos 1994; Gummesson 1997) .
From the seller's perspective, the challenge presented by the emerging paradigm of relationship marketing is to determine a sequence of marketing decisions and behavior capable of establishing, developing, and maintaining successful relationships with buyers (e.g., Morgan and Hunt 1994) . For many scholars, it is no longer possible to focus on marketing mix as the only set of strategic marketing variables (e.g., Grönroos 1994) . Given improved technologies, resources, and skills, competitors are increasingly able to meet the quality of any offer in the market. One of the critical consequences of this trend has been an amplified focus on pricing and sales promotion to attract customers in the short term, which, unfortunately, increases customers' sensibility to prices and decreases their loyalty to brands.
The fundamental idea of relationship marketing is to go beyond short-term transactional marketing actions and to build loyalty to brands and sellers. To accomplish this, sellers must design marketing programs such that loyal and committed customers receive more value than disloyal customers. There are numerous benefits for sellers in pursuing such a paradigm, including increased access to markets, generating repeat purchases, creating exit barriers, positive word of mouth, and information sharing (see Anderson 1998; Berry 1995; Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987; Hennig-Thurau, Gwinner, and Gremler 2002; Panda 2003; Saren and Tzokas 1998) .
Despite the intense interest in customer relationship management, the growing body of relationship marketing and customer relationship management literature still faces several challenges. For example, the critical issue of resource allocation for building and maintaining successful relational exchanges has not been fully examined. Rather, several studies have investigated the link between behavioral antecedents and outcomes of relational exchanges (e.g., Andaleeb 1996; Hunt and Morgan 1994; Sirdeshmukh, Singh, and Sabol 2002) . On the other hand, researchers have also studied the effectiveness of relational marketing efforts such as direct mail, tangible rewards, and preferential treatment, as well as customers' relationship perceptions on more operational management constructs, including customer retention rate and customer share (e.g., De Wulf, Odekerken-Schröder, and Iacobucci 2001; Verhoef 2003) . Although these studies have generated significant knowledge on the effectiveness of various relational marketing efforts, their methodological approach, generally based on survey and aggregated panel data from customers, does not explicitly address the seller's decision-making process.
Other relevant methodological approaches available in the transactional marketing literature that can cope with the dyadic or/and dynamic nature of relational exchanges have not been extensively used. For instance, the field of analytic modeling has been surprisingly timid in addressing relational issues. The first known exception is the recent book chapter by Sigué and Elloumi (2002) . The authors of this chapter use a system of differential equations to describe how relational commitments are established and maintained. They build a bridge between relationship marketing and a well-known modeling approach used in applied mathematics to describe love dynamics between two individuals (e.g., Feichtinger, Jørgensen, and Novak 1999; Rinaldi 1998a Rinaldi , 1998b Rinaldi and Gragnani 1998) . The model of love dynamics takes three aspects of love into account: the forgetting process, the pleasure of being loved, and the reaction to the appeal of the partner. Sigué and Elloumi's model assumes that relational commitments between two exchange partners are driven by trust, opportunistic behavior, and the partners' appeal. However, the model remains descriptive and does not indicate how marketing decisions are made in order to establish and maintain relational exchanges.
Although a complete marketing program may well include both transactional and relational marketing (see Coviello et al. 2002; Hultman and Shaw 2003) , in this article, we deliberately focus on relational marketing actions. We propose, for the first time, an analytic model dealing with both behavioral considerations between exchange partners and the determination of relational marketing efforts. Our model goes beyond the descriptive dynamics of Sigué and Elloumi and prescribes an optimal way of determining relational marketing efforts while sellers aim at maximizing their discounted utility. It is our thesis that the problem of establishing and maintaining long-run relational exchanges is an optimal control problem in which the ultimate goal of the seller is to maximize her intertemporal utility. 1 We consider that the seller's relational utility stems from the commitments of the two exchange partners, which are built by three main components: (a) the trust/distrust component, which is the willingness/reluctance of a party to rely on the trustworthiness of the other; (b) the opportunism component, to capture a partner's own forgetfulness or failure to remember previous commitments over time; and (c) the seller's relational marketing efforts, which can be either an economic reward or other social activities creating social and psychological benefits for the buyer. Unlike the behavioral literature of customer relationship management that has studied the effectiveness of various relational marketing instruments, our normative approach assumes that the seller is the decision maker and has direct control over her relational marketing efforts (e.g., De Wulf, OdekerkenSchröder, and Iacobucci 2001; Verhoef 2003) .
Our main finding supports the view that the seller's relational marketing effort should increase (decrease) with any increase (decrease) over time of trust between the two partners, the effectiveness of the relational marketing program on the partners' commitments, and of the partners' contributions to the seller's relational benefits. On the other hand, it should decrease (increase) with any increase (decrease) over time of opportunistic propensities and distrust of the two partners. Our model advocates the use of real-time relational marketing programs in the context of relational exchanges involving personal interactions, continuous changes in the structural and contextual relational environment, and a variety of relational marketing instruments, as it is often the case in the service industry. But it also applies to conservative partners involved in a stable relationship in which the parameters affecting the dynamics of their commitment do not change over time, as in the case of several reward-based loyalty programs in consumer markets.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. First, we discuss relational commitment and its driving factors.
Second, we present our model and determine its optimal policy. Third, we consider some typical behavioral situations encountered in relational exchanges. In the last section, we conclude and discuss our findings.
BUILDING A RELATIONAL COMMITMENT
One of the most critical concepts of relationship marketing is relational commitment. Many scholars share this view (e.g., Garbarino and Johnson 1999; Gundlach, Achrol and Mentzer 1995; Morgan and Hunt 1994) . For example, Morgan and Hunt (1994) considered relational commitment as one of the two key mediating variables of relationship marketing. Gundlach, Achrol, and Mentzer (1995) viewed commitment as an essential ingredient of successful long-term relationships. With a few empirical exceptions, the relationship marketing literature recognizes the existence of positive relationships between commitment among partners and many favorable constructs that create relational value, such as trust, cooperation, acquiescence, loyalty, functional conflict, communication, and satisfaction (De Wulf, Odekerken-Schröder, and Iacobucci 2001; Grayson and Ambler 1999; Moorman, Zaltman, and Deshpandé 1992; Verhoef 2003) . Relational commitment is generally considered as a behavioral outcome of fruitful interactions between exchange partners (Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987; Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar 1999) .
Following Morgan and Hunt (1994) , we assume that relational commitment is an exchange partner's belief that an ongoing relationship with another is sufficiently important as to deserve maximum efforts to maintain it. Committed partners are those who are able to make short-term sacrifices to realize long-term benefits. Therefore, the current and future success of relational exchanges may be evaluated through the partners' relational commitments. As a forward-looking concept, commitment implies the presence and consistency over time of both the attachment and the willingness to maintain a relationship. Obviously, the willingness to continue a relationship stems from the social and economic benefits that each partner accumulates from it (Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987; Gassenheimer, Houston, and Davis 1998) . Although this conceptualization seems very comprehensible, it is not clear how partners should effectively build and maintain relational commitments among them or what kind of inputs exchange partners should use to reach relational commitment.
Drawing on the framework of political economy (see Gassenheimer, Houston, and Davis 1998; Stern and Reve 1980) and the work of Gundlach, Achrol and Mentzer (1995) , we claim that both economic and social drivers lead to relational commitments. Successful long-term relationships make use of both drivers. According to Gassenheimer, Houston, and Davis (1998) , the economic driver can be explained using transactional cost analysis (Williamson 1983) . Transactional cost analysis stresses transactional efficiency and the cost of existing relationships. The economic driver of commitment corresponds to what Gundlach, Achrol, and Mentzer (1995) called an instrumental view of commitment. In this case, commitment is a calculative act in which committed parties want to improve their own economic benefits through reducing transaction costs and to limit relational opportunism through specific investments. Our work borrows from this view and addresses relational investments and the opportunism of exchange partners.
We define relational investments as marketing efforts or investments undertaken by an exchange partner to create and maintain relational commitments with another partner. The relationship literature distinguishes among three levels of relationship marketing activities, including economic incentives, marketing tactics with social attributes, and structural marketing solutions to customer problems (see Berry 1995) . The relationship marketing theory postulates a positive relationship between relational marketing investments and commitment. For example, De Wulf, Odekerken-Schröder, and Iacobucci (2001) investigated the impact of perceived relationship investment on relationship quality, including relational commitment, and found a positive path from the first to the latter. Note that relational marketing efforts are different from traditional or transactional marketing efforts, which can generate sales at a given period but have very little impact on the level of relational commitments.
We define opportunism as an exchange partner's propensity to reduce his or her instantaneous level of commitment at any time, as his or her previous level of commitment is high. We assume that opportunism is supported by a partner's forgetfulness and unwillingness to respect commitments over time, which create inconsistency between previous commitments and the level of commitment at a specific time. This inconsistency is misleading for the other exchange partner who is more likely to take previous commitment as a warrant for present and future commitments. Our conceptualization of opportunism is consistent with the concept of passive opportunism (see Wathne and Heide 2000) . Opportunistic partners, purposely or not, adopt behavior contrary to the principle of maintaining a long-term relational exchange. Here, we consider that they are characterized by neglectful or selfish failure to remember their commitments over time. The impact of opportunism on the relational commitment is known to be negative (Gundlach, Achrol, and Mentzer 1995; Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne 2003) .
The social driver of relational commitment comes from social exchange theory, which argues that parties evaluate relationships within a behavioral context (Gassenheimer, Houston, and Davis 1998) . In this case, commitment is perceived as an attitudinal outcome, which can be described in terms of psychological attachment, identification, and value congruence (Gundlach, Achrol, and Mentzer 1995) . This attitudinal view of commitment has been predominant in the marketing literature (e.g., Doney and Cannon 1997; Garbarino and Johnson 1999; Sirdeshmukh, Singh, and Sabol 2002) . It associates commitment with prominent behavioral constructs such as satisfaction and trust. In a recent meta-analysis, Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar (1999) found that the positive relationship between trust and commitment is unanimous. Therefore, in a relationship where there is mutual trust, it is more likely that partners hold higher levels of commitment. Conversely, mutual distrust can prevent parties from committing to a relationship. We assume that trust (distrust) is a significant input to building long-term relational commitments. We define trust/distrust as the willingness/ reluctance of a party to rely on the trustworthiness of the other in building up its own commitment. This definition is consistent with other definitions in the literature focusing on cognitive and behavioral perspectives of trust (e.g., Andaleeb 1996; Anderson and Narus 1990).
Finally, we treat economic and social drivers as additive and separable forces that contribute to relational commitment. This conceptualization allows compensation between the two types of drivers. Lack of trust may be balanced by relational marketing investment and still lead to higher relational commitments. At the same time, trust may help to overcome some economic and social investment deficiencies to higher relational commitments.
THE MODEL The Dynamics of Commitment
We consider a seller who wants to build a long-term relational exchange with a buyer. Let x s = x s (t) and x b = x b (t) be state variables that, respectively, measure the levels of commitment in the relational exchange of the seller and the buyer at time t. The seller's commitment translates to the willingness of the seller to stay in the relationship with the buyer, which, in turn, leads to relational marketing investments, or the improvement of the relational value offered to the buyer. The buyer's commitment leads to loyalty or discernible repeat purchasing or buying behavior, facilitates communication, and generates positive word of mouth (see Morgan and Hunt 1994; Verhoef 2003) . There is a reciprocal relational indifference when the values of x b and x s are zero. This will appear when the partners have no interest in staying in a relational exchange. Otherwise, if the two partners are in a relational exchange, their respective commitment is positive. Thus, we assume
We use two premises to model relational commitment. One is that the relational commitment between the seller and the buyer is unbalanced. The other is that the seller manages the establishment of the relational exchange with the buyer. These two premises are related and are common in many applications of relationship marketing in consumer markets (see Blattberg and Deighton 1991; De Wulf, Odekerken-Schröder, and Iacobucci 2001; Gruen 1995; O'Malley and Tynan 2000) . The first premise claims that the seller has more interest in establishing and maintaining a long-term relational commitment than the buyer. As a consequence, the second premise gives an active role to the seller in the relational exchange, whereas the buyer plays a reactive role. Stated differently, the seller is the person who offers something of value to the buyer or undertakes some idiosyncratic investments for the relationship. This second premise is implicit in the growing literature of customer relationship management (see Berry 1995; Parvatiyar and Sheth 2001; Sheth and Parvatiyar 1995a) .
Let u = u(t) be a control variable that represents the seller's relationship marketing efforts at time t. The variable u(t) can be any relationship marketing activity fitting into Berry's (1995) first two levels of relationship marketing. According to Berry (1995) , the first level relies on economic incentives or offers tangible rewards over time to develop and maintain relationships. The second level of relationship marketing focuses on social aspects of a relationship and offers social and psychological benefits to customers (see Panda 2003) . We assume that whether the seller's marketing effort, u(t), creates economic value or social and psychological benefits for the buyer, it increases the seller's own commitment to the relationship. This specification is consistent with Gundlach, Achrol, and Mentzer's (1995) view that commitment possesses an input or instrumental component. The seller's marketing effort is modeled as an input for building up the commitment of the buyer as well as a bonding mechanism for the seller herself.
Assume that the levels of commitment of the two exchange partners evolve according to the following dynamics:
where
timevariant and bounded functions in the interval 0 t ≤ ∞.
The specification in (2) assumes that the change in partner i's level of relational commitment can be considered as an additive separable function of three terms. The first term, -β i x i , represents the opportunistic behavior of partner i, where β i (called the opportunistic propensity coefficient), measures the honest forgetfulness and neglectful or selfish failure to remember commitments of partner i over time. The opportunistic propensity coefficient depends on the partner's own personality, value system, and care, as well as on the structural and contextual environment of the exchange. For example, a relational marketing program occurring in a context where both parties share strong norms of solidarity is likely to evolve with low opportunistic propensities from both sides (Gundlach, Achrol, and Mentzer 1995; Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne 2003) . Also, disproportionate structural investments between the two partners can lead to higher opportunistic propensity from the less involved partner (Gundlach, Achrol, and Mentzer 1995) . Although such structural investments can also be considered as relationship marketing (Level 3 of relationship marketing in Berry's classification), we consider here that they are exogenous and indirectly affect the commitment of the partners through their opportunistic propensity. The second term, θ i x j , is a reaction function of partner i to partner j's commitment. Parameter θ i captures partner i's level of trust/distrust over time. A positive θ i means that partner i trusts partner j and relies on partner j's trustworthiness. A negative θ i indicates that partner i distrusts partner j and does not rely on partner j's trustworthiness. Finally, partner i is trust-indifferent to partner j when θ i = 0. Our specification assumes that exogenous factors to the model influence the level of trust/distrust between the two exchange partners. The literature identifies several antecedents of trust, including relationship termination costs, shared values, communication, and opportunistic behavior that can influence the trust/distrust between the two partners (e.g., Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar 1999; Morgan and Hunt 1994) . According to our model specification, a trusting partner will increase his or her instantaneous level of commitment as the commitment of his or her partner increases. This stems from the application of the principle of reciprocity that fosters positive relational exchange (Bagozzi 1995; De Wulf, Odekerken-Schröder, and Iacobucci 2001) . Conversely, a distrusting partner will decrease his or her instantaneous level of commitment as the commitment of his or her partner increases. For the first case, the partner's commitment is desired; for the latter, it is not welcomed. In the latter case, many researchers have recognized the existence of scenarios in which the seller wishes for a long-term relationship, whereas the buyer does not (see Barnes 1994; Berry 1995; Sheth and Parvatiyar 1995b) .
The third term, α i u, represents the impact of the seller's relational marketing effort on her own and the buyer's levels of commitment at time t. The parameter α i represents the effectiveness of the seller's relational marketing effort on partner i's commitment. In a similar specification, Sigué and Elloumi (2002) called the third term the intrinsic exchange benefit and considered it as a subjective concept capturing the appeal of partner i to partner j. In addition, they assumed time-invariant parameters and did not treat the appeal as an outcome of purposeful marketing decisions. In our specification, α b could be considered as the effectiveness of the seller's marketing effort in building and maintaining the buyer's commitment or the level of interest of the buyer to the seller's relational marketing effort over time. There is empirical evidence that α b changes with the nature of the seller's relationship marketing activities and the buyer's characteristics (see De Wulf, Odekerken-Schröder, and Iacobucci 2001; Verhoef 2003) . On the other side, α s indicates the effectiveness of the relational marketing effort on the seller's own commitment over time. Several factors may influence this effectiveness, including the value of the buyer and the cost of designing and implementing the program. Therefore, we postulate that a relational marketing program that has a high value for the seller and meets the interest of the buyer will generate higher levels of commitment from both sides.
We assume in (2) that, at the starting point, the two relational partners' levels of commitment are zero. This assumption allows us to determine what level of marketing effort is needed to start a relational exchange.
Note that our assumption of time-variable parameters in (2) means that, at any time of the relationship, every exchange partner actively screens available data to determine the current values of opportunistic propensity, trust/ distrust, and the effectiveness of the seller's relational marketing efforts in building relational commitments. This specification includes, of course, the particular case of time-invariant parameters in (2) that may occur if the exchange partners do not change their opportunistic propensity, trust/distrust, and interest for the seller's relationship marketing program. We refer to these types of relational partners as conservative partners. Conservative partners favor relational stability and are more likely to remain committed as long as the initial conditions that led to their original commitment do not change. Prior to their commitment, they have hearsay evidence on their partner's trustworthiness, opportunistic propensity, and response to relational investments on which they rely during the time their relational exchange lasts (see Palmer 2000) . This is particularly true because trust about a partner may be built through market intelligence, as it is often the case for onetime transactions such as buying a house (Parvatiyar and Sheth 2001) .
The Seller's Problem
Our goal in this study is to investigate how a seller can manage (establish and maintain) a long-lasting relationship with the buyer. Specifically, assuming the impact of relational marketing effort, u, depends on her economic and psychological effort, our objective is to determine how the seller should choose u in order to maximize her utility from the relational commitment over time.
We have two assumptions here. First, we suppose that relational benefits may go beyond sales and profit and incorporate several other dimensions for the seller. As a matter of fact, this is consistent with the view of Parvatiyar and Sheth (2001) that, although the overall purpose of a relational marketing program is to increase marketing productivity and enhance mutual value for the partners, the seller can specify her relational benefits (objectives) in terms of financial goals, marketing goals, strategic goals, operational goals, and organizational goals. We specify the seller's relational benefits as a function of both relational commitments, ƒ(x b , x s ). Note ƒ(x b , x s ) is a function that transforms the two partners' commitments into relational benefits for the seller. Second, as mentioned, the seller supports costs for undertaking relational marketing efforts with a buyer that, according to Hibbard et al. (2001) , encompass economic, psychological, and opportunity costs involved from forgone alternatives. We assume these costs can be translated to a single unit (e.g., monetary terms) and represented as follows: C = C(u).
Considering the above assumptions, and the dynamics of both partners' relational commitments, the generic problem of how the seller can establish and maintain a long-lasting relationship with the buyer over a planning period can be stated formally by the following optimal control problem: 
. . 
In problem (3), r denotes the seller's constant and positive discount rate, which can also be considered as the seller's rate of time preference for future utility. Higher values of r mean that the seller is shortsighted and discounts heavily future relational utility, which may be the attainment of any combination of financial goals, marketing goals, strategic goals, operational goals, and organizational goals through a relational exchange with a buyer.
For simplicity we assume that the relationship benefits function ƒ is a linear combination of both relational commitments, that is,
where c b = c b (t) and c s = c s (t) are nonnegative time-variant parameters denoting, respectively, the contribution of each partner's commitment into the seller's relational benefits. Note that the linear separable function specification in (4) does not account for situations where the joint effect of the two partners' commitments increases or decreases the seller's relational benefits. Although such a general specification is possible by adding a third multiplicative term involving the two commitments into the right-hand side of (4), it adds nontrivial mathematical intricacies to the problem. The utility function in (4) can be used, for example, in finding an optimal relational marketing policy that maximizes the profit earned from a customer over the entire period of a relational exchange. This is similar to maximizing the lifetime value of the customer, which can be defined as the profit generated from an individual customer over time (see Berger, Weinberg, and Hanna 2003; Gupta and Lehmann 2003; Jain and Singh 2002) . In this context, the parameters c b and c s of the seller's relational benefits in (4) could respectively be considered as the conversion rate of the buyer's commitment to gross margin and the efficiency gain (e.g., transaction cost reduction) generated due to the seller's own commitment.
As is common in the marketing literature, the impact of marketing efforts has the property of decreasing returns. The study of Hibbard et al. (2001) also supports this property in the context of relational marketing activities. With this in mind, again for simplicity, we consider the following specification for seller's relational marketing effort costs:
The cost function C(u) does not take into account other marketing cost (advertising, for example) that the seller will support in the absence of a relational marketing program. For simplicity, we assume these costs are zero if they do not change when the seller introduces her relational marketing program. Otherwise, in the case where the relational marketing program helps reduce the other marketing costs, as has been claimed in the literature, we consider that it generates a gain of efficiency, which is taken into account in (4) through the positive contribution of the seller's commitment into the seller's relational benefits (see Kalwani and Narayandas 1995) .
OPTIMAL POLICY
To solve problem (3) by considering (4) and (5), we use dynamic optimization techniques (e.g., Kamien and Schwartz 1991) . We conclude with the following results.
Theorem 1 (optimal policy): Consider the relational benefits optimization problem (3)- (5). Then, the optimal relational marketing effort (spending) to establish and maintain a relational commitment between the seller and the buyer is time-variant and nonzero if and only if the seller and buyer commitments are positive (nonzero). In case of positive commitments, the magnitude of this relational marketing effort depends nonlinearly on several factors, including the contribution of each partner's commitment into the seller's relational benefits, the opportunistic propensity and the trust/distrust coefficients of the two partners, the seller's preference for future utility, and the response of each partner to the relational marketing effort or investment. Formally, it has the following structure:
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Proof: See appendix.
The optimal decision rule in (6) is very appealing and requires that the seller should make real-time relational marketing decisions based on the current values of the model parameters. Practically, this means that, at any time t, the seller should assess the state of the relationship between herself and the buyer and adjust her relational marketing effort in view of that assessment. The optimal decision rule in (6) reveals that the seller's investment in relationship marketing at any time t should be high if the two exchange partners mutually maintain high levels of trust and value this type of investment in building and maintaining their commitment. In addition, the seller should allocate heavy resources to building and maintaining relational commitments if she is farsighted and receives bigger contributions to her relational benefits from the buyer's and her own commitments. As expected, in a context characterized by high opportunistic propensities or distrust either from the seller herself or from the buyer, the seller should allocate minor resources to relational marketing efforts.
The special form of the optimal control rule (6) leads to the following important result.
Theorem 2: Consider the relational benefits optimization problem (3)- (5). Then the optimal relational marketing effort (spending) that establishes and maintains relational commitments between the seller and the buyer is constant over time if and only if the opportunistic propensities, the trust/distrust coefficients of the two partners, the response of each partner to the relational marketing effort, and the contribution of each partner's commitment into the seller's relational benefits, are all time-invariant.
As stated earlier, the case of time-invariant parameters described in Theorem 2 is more likely to occur when the structural and contextual environment of the relationship remains unchanged and the two exchange partners are conservative. In such a context, establishing and maintaining a relational commitment with the buyer requires the same level of marketing effort for the seller at any time. Several loyalty programs in consumer markets that, according to some scholars, create commitment to incentives (marketing effort) rather than commitment to the seller fall into this category (e.g., Barnes 1994) .
Note that substituting (6) into (2) leads to a nonhomogeneous system of differential equations with time-variant coefficients that can be solved analytically to obtain the optimal commitment trajectories, x b (t) and x s (t) (see Boyce and Diprima 1986, p. 387) .
Considering the optimal policy (6), we obtain the following results.
Proposition 1: The seller's relational marketing effort increases (decreases) with an increase (decrease) over time of trust between the two partners, the effectiveness of the relational marketing program on the partners' commitments, and the partner's contributions to the seller's relational benefits. On the other hand, it decreases (increases) with an increase (decrease) over time of opportunistic propensities of the two partners.
Although we have treated trust/distrust, opportunity propensity, the effectiveness of the seller's relational marketing, and the relational benefit contributions as exogenous factors to our model, Proposition 1 reveals that in case they change over time, the seller's relational marketing efforts will necessarily change to reflect the current situation. To improve the seller's relational benefits over time, other actions different from relational marketing efforts studied in our model should be planned to increase trust, the effectiveness of the seller's relational marketing effort, and the relational benefit contributions of the two exchange partners, as well as to decrease opportunistic propensities and distrust over time.
TYPICAL BEHAVIORAL SITUATIONS
We can get better insights into the optimal policy by examining special cases that reflect typical behavioral situations encountered in the marketing literature.
Trust/Distrust Effects
We first focus on the effects of the two partners' trust/ distrust on their relational commitment. For this purpose, let us examine some hypothetical cases by assuming that both partners experience equal opportunistic propensities, value identically the seller's marketing effort in building their commitment, and that their contributions to the seller's relational benefits are the same over time. In other words, we have the following relationships between the parameters of our model: Keeping all other parameters symmetric as in (7), we want to analyze three trust scenarios: mutual trust over time
when the seller is the trusting partner, whereas the buyer is the distrusting partner, thus θ b (t) < 0 and θ s (t) > 0 and finally asymmetric-trust over time (with the seller holding a higher level of trust, θ s (t) > θ b (t) > 0).
Considering Theorem 1, we have the following results for these scenarios.
Proposition 2 (trust effects): Assume (7). Then over time:
a. The levels of commitment of both the buyer and seller in a mutual trust scenario are equal. b. The seller's marketing effort in a trust-distrust scenario is lower than the marketing effort for mutual trust.
In the long run (steady state): c. The levels of commitment of a trust-distrust scenario are lower than the levels of commitment of a mutual trust scenario. d. In a trust-distrust scenario, the level of commitment of the seller is higher than that of the buyer. e. If the seller trusts the buyer more, then the level of commitment of the seller is higher than that of the buyer.
Proposition 2 highlights several important effects of trust on the levels of commitment and on the seller's marketing effort. In item (a), mutual and symmetric trusting partners holding positive expectations of their partner's commitment develop equal levels of commitment over time. In the longer term, however, the levels of commitment of mutually symmetric trusting partners prevail over those of trustdistrusting partners (item c). This result can be explained by the fact that the seller in a mutually symmetric trusting scenario invests more in relational marketing than in the opposite situation (item b). From item (b), it can also be said that the lack of reciprocity between the two exchange partners prevents the seller from allocating heavy resources to relational marketing programs (Bagozzi 1995) . From items (d) and (e), whether with a trust-distrust scenario or a mutual asymmetric trust scenario, the more trusting party, here the seller, maintains a higher level of commitment than the less trusting, the buyer.
Opportunism Effects
Now let us focus on the opportunistic propensity of the partners. To this end, we assume that both partners experience the same level of trust, value identically the seller's marketing effort in building their commitment, and that the two partners' contributions to the seller's relational benefits are the same. In other words, we have the following relationships between the model parameters:
We analyze a scenario when the buyer (seller) is more opportunistic than the seller (buyer), that is, β b (t) > β s (t) (β s (t) > β b (t)). Considering (8) and again Theorem 1, we have the following results.
Proposition 3 (opportunistic behavior effects): Assume (8). Then in the long run (steady state), if the buyer is more (less) opportunistic than the seller, then the level of commitment of the buyer is lower (higher) than that of the seller.
The effects of opportunistic behavior on the levels of commitment of the two partners are straightforward. The partner with the higher opportunistic propensity commits less than the other. This result is consistent with the relationship marketing literature, which considers opportunistic behavior as a detrimental factor for commitment.
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
This research studied how a seller can manage an optimal intertemporal marketing program that maintains long-term relational commitments with a buyer and maximizes utility. Our main message is that the problem of establishing and maintaining relational exchange can be studied using the methodology of optimal control. This approach is possible in those applications of relationship marketing in consumer markets in which the seller designs a marketing program to gain the commitment of the buyer. It may also be possible in the service industry and some business-to-business exchanges where the seller undertakes investments for the relationship and the buyer does not.
Contributions
Building on a well-known modeling approach used in applied mathematics for love dynamics and on the behavioral marketing literature, we developed an analytic model of two-partner relational commitments. We postulated that the success of relational exchanges could be measured through the partners' commitments, which are the source of relational benefits. Our model specification assumes that the partners' relational commitments are driven by the trust/distrust component, the opportunism component, and the seller's relational marketing effort. In this context, we wish to show how the seller should determine her optimal marketing effort to build and maintain fruitful relational commitments with a buyer. This research extends the emerging paradigm of relationship marketing and customer relationship management, which has focused on relational behavior and the study of the effectiveness of relational marketing instruments with little attention to decision making or has indirectly addressed decisionmaking issues without the formal approach of optimal control (e.g., Berry 1995; De Wulf, Odekerken-Schröder, and Iacobucci 2001; Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987; Hibbard et al. 2001; Morgan and Hunt 1994; Sigué and Elloumi 2002; Verhoef 2003) .
Our main finding supports the view that an optimal control rule for building and maintaining long-term relational commitments that maximize the seller's discounted utility consists of a time-variant relational marketing program. At any time, the seller's relational marketing effort depends nonlinearly on the current value of several parameters, including the contribution of each partner's commitment to the seller's relational benefits, the opportunistic propensity and trust/distrust coefficients of the two partners, the seller's preference for future utility, and the effectiveness of the seller's relational marketing effort in building her own and the buyer's commitments. In particular, the seller's relational marketing effort increases (decreases) with an increase (decrease) over time of the trust between the two partners, the effectiveness of the relational marketing program on the partners' commitments, and the partners' contributions to the seller's relational benefits. On the other hand, it decreases (increases) with an increase (decrease) over time of opportunistic propensities and distrust of the two partners.
We believe that this type of real-time relational marketing program applies to relational exchanges involving more personal interactions, continuous changes in the structural and contextual relational environment, and a variety of relational marketing instruments, as in the context of the service industry. These require that the seller constantly listen and scrutinize the requirements and behavior of customers and adjust her relational marketing activities as a result. Our findings also apply to what we have called conservative partners or partners involved in a stable relationship where the parameters affecting the dynamics of their commitment do not change over time. It is our belief that this is the case in several reward-based loyalty programs in consumer markets in which the main driver of a consumer's commitment is the reward itself (Barnes 1994) . On the other hand, the seller's relational marketing is standard for many consumers and does not need a continuous adjustment to the situation of a particular consumer (De Wulf, Odekerken-Schröder, and Iacobucci 2001) .
Since the work by Moorman, Zaltman, and Deshpandé (1992) , followed by the replication of Grayson and Ambler (1999) , the effectiveness of long-term relationship marketing over time has been questioned. Recently, Hibbard et al. (2001) concluded that although relational commitment and other components of relationship marketing continue to have a positive effect on the performance of exchange partners, this positive effect diminishes over time. Hibbard and colleagues (2001) then suggested that managers should recognize that there is a downside to using relational marketing strategy and consequently, identify the true costs of the inputs necessary for maintaining successful and mutually beneficial relational exchanges. Our generic model supports this view and demonstrates that the determination of an optimal relational marketing program over time should be based on a continuous costbenefit analysis. In addition, it should also integrate rele-vant evaluation over time of the partners' opportunism, trust/distrust, and response to the marketing efforts that have been proved to be critical in the relationship marketing literature (e.g., Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987; Gundlach, Achrol, and Mentzer 1995; Morgan and Hunt 1994) . As a matter of fact, our analysis of typical behavioral situations in Propositions 2 and 3 support the relationship marketing theory that trust and opportunistic behavior are respectively beneficial and detrimental both for the seller's relational marketing effort and the two partners' relational commitments. Last, our model offers a general framework for understanding and managing relational exchanges. For example, an increase of relational commitment over time may not be useful for the seller if, at the same time, either her own commitment contribution or the contribution of the buyer's commitment to her relational benefit decreases significantly over time. According to Kalwani and Narayandas (1995) , this is more likely to occur if, in the longer term, the buyer becomes more sensible to the economic value of the seller's offer and strives to share equitably relational benefits or serving the buyer becomes very costly for the seller. On the other hand, heavy investments in relationship marketing efforts may be useless if they provide no significant value to the buyer to justify his commitment or, at the same time, occur in the context of opportunistic behavior and distrust, especially from the buyer. As a consequence, our findings support that the seller should continuously assess the effectiveness of her relationship marketing programs. As recent studies have shown, not all relational marketing instruments are effective in building relational commitment with all consumers (De Wulf, Odekerken-Schröder, and Iacobucci 2001; Verhoef 2003) . The use of ineffective instruments should not lead to the questioning of the theory of relationship marketing. Also, even with effective instruments that fit into the first two levels of relationship marketing according to Berry's (1995) classification, we believe that the seller may need additional actions either to reduce opportunistic behavior or to increase/decrease trust/distrust. Therefore, assessing the effectiveness of relational marketing efforts on the buyer's commitment should also pay attention to the structural and contextual environment of the relationship. The importance of the structural and contextual environment of relationships is well recognized in the literature. For example, a study by Wathne, Biong, and Heide (2001) downplays the role of interpersonal relationships-second level of relationship marketing in Berry's (1995) classification-in the context of business-tobusiness services, and shows that switching barriers and traditional marketing variables (price and product breadth) play a significant role in the buyer's choice of a supplier. The authors then conclude that "a customer's role as friend may assume less importance in the presence of explicit competitive offers" (Wathne, Biong, and Heide 2001, p. 62) . The same thing can easily be said for relational marketing programs based on some economic rewards.
Limitations and Future Research
We deliberately made our theoretical approach simple in order to allow for analytic insights. Some of our assumptions can be relaxed. First, we have assumed a linear additive separable function for the seller's relational benefit. This assumption allows a degenerate feedback solution, which does not depend on the relational commitments. Although more advanced specifications of the seller's relational benefit function should be considered for future extensions, in many cases, however, their tractability might be a cumbersome task. Second, our current model assumes an unbalanced relationship between the two exchange partners wherein the seller is the only party investing in the relational exchange. We acknowledge that this unbalance could be either in the buyer's favor when a product is being sold (e.g., Kalwani and Naraynadas 1995) or in the seller's favor when a service is being sold (e.g., Kumar 1999) . Also, in many business-to-business cases this assumption does not hold. Both the seller and the buyer often invest in the relational exchange to enhance their mutual commitments. Third, our model does not take competition into account. In the real world, competitors often duplicate relational marketing programs to reduce their competitive power. Relational marketing programs such as recommended here could then be ineffective in the face of so-called me-too relational marketing programs. Third, even using our approach, it seems worthwhile to attempt to modify the commitment dynamics to generate more complex relational marketing programs. The authors are actively working in this direction.
APPENDIX Proof of Theorem 1
Consider the optimal control problem (3) with the assumption in ( 
